The questions before this panel presuppose a distinction between parsing and interpretation. There are two other simple and obvious distinctions that I think are necessary for a reasonable discussion of the issues. First, we must clearly distinguish between the static specification of a process and its dynamic execution. Second, we must clearly distinguish two purposes that a natural language processing system might serve: one legitimate goal of a system is to perform some practical ~sk efficiently and well. while a second goal is to assist in developing a scientific understanding of the cognitive operations that underlie human language processing. 1 will refer to pa~rs primarily oriented towards the former goal as Practical Parsers (PP) and refer to the others as Performance Model Parsers (PMP). With these distinctions in mind. let me now turn to the questions at hand.
The Computational Perspective.
From a computadonal point of view. there are obvious reasons for distinguishing parsing from interpretation. Parsing is the process whereby linearly ordered scquences of character strings annotated with information found in a stored lexicon are transduced into labelled hierarchical structures. Interpretation maps such structures either into structures with different formal properties, such as logical formulas, or into sequences of actions to be performed on a logical model or database. On the face of it, unless we ignore the obvious formal differences between string--to--structure and structure--to--structure mappings, parsing is thus formally and conceptually distinct from interpretation.
The specifications of thc two processes necessarily mention different kinds of operations that are sensitive to different-features of the input and express quite different generalizations about the correspondences betwecn form and meaning.
As far as I can see. these are simply factual assertions about which there can be little or no debate. Beyond this level, however, there are a number of controversial issues. Even though parsing and interpretation operations are recognizably distinct, they can be combined in a variety of ways to construct a natural language understanding system.
For example, the static specification of a s~stem could freely intermix parsing and interpretation operations, so that there is no part of the program text that is clearly identifiable as the parser or interpreter, and perhaps no part that can even be thought of as more pa~er-like or interpreter-like than any other. Although the microscopic operations fall into two classes, there is no notion in such a system of separate parsing and interpretation components at a macroscopic te~cl. .Macroscopiealty. it might be argued` a ,~yslcm specified in this way does not embody a parsmg/interprcmtitm distinctmn.
On the other hand. we can imagine a system whose static specification is carefully divided into two parts, one that only specifies parsing operations and expresses parsing generalizations and one that involves only interpretation specifications. And there arc clearly untold numbers of system configurations that fall somewhere between these extremes.
I take it to be uncontrovcrsial that. other things being equal, a homogenized system is less preferable on both practical and scientific grounds to one that naturally decomposes. Practically. such a system is easier to build and maintain, since the parts can be designed, developed, and understood to a certain extent in isolation, perhaps even by people working independently. Scientifically. a decomposable system is much more likely to provide insight into the process of natural language eomprehe~ion, whether by machines or people. The reasons for this can be found in Simon's classic essay on the Architecture of Complexity. and in other places as well.
The debate arises from the contention that there are important "other things" that cannot be made equal, given a completely decomposed static specification. In particular, it is suggested that parsing and interpretation operations must be partially or totally interleaved during the execuuon of a comprehension process. For practical systems, arguments are advanced that a "habitable" system, one that human clients fecl comfortable using, must be able to interpret inputs before enough information is available for a complete syntactic structure or when the syntactic information that is available does not lead to a consistent parse. It is also argued that interpretation must be performed in the middle of parsing in the interests of reasonable efficiency: the interpreter can reject sub-constituents that are semantically or pragmatically unacceptable and thereby permit early truncation of long paths of syntactic computation. From the performance model perspective, it is suggested that humans seem able to make syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic decisions in parallel, and the ability to simulate this capability is thus a condition of adequacy for any psycholinguistic model.
All these arguments favor a system where the operations of parsing and interpretation are interleaved during dynamic execution, and perhaps even executed on parallel hardware (or wetware, from the PMP perspective), If parsing and interpretation are run-time indistinguishable, it is claimed, then parsing and interpretation must be part and parcel of the same monolithic process.
Of course, whether or not there is dynamic fusit)n of parsing and interpetation is an empirical question which might be answered differently for practical systems than for perlbrmance models, and might even be answered differently ior different practical implementations. Depending on the relative computational efficiency of parsing versus interpretation operations, dynamic intcrlc:ning might increase or decrease ovendl system efli:'ctivcness. For example, in our work t.n the I.UNAR system /Woods. Kaolan. & Nash-Webbcr. 1q72), we fl)tmd it more ellicient to detbr semantic prt~.cssmg until after a complete, well-l~.,nncd parse had been discovered. The consistency checks embedded in the grammar could rule out syntactically unacceptable structures much more quickly than our particular interpretation component was able to do. More recendy. Martin. Church. and Ramesh (1981) have claimed that overall efficiency is greatest if all syntactic analyses are computed in breadth-fi~t fashion before any semantic operations are executed. These results might be taken to indicate that the particular semantic components were poorly conceived and implemented, with little bearing on systems where interpretation is done "properly" (or parsing is done improperly). But they do make the point that a practical decision on the dynamic fusion of parsing and interpretation cannot be made a priori, without a detailed study of the many other factors that can influence a system's computational resource demands.
Whatever conclusion we arrive at from practical considerations, there is no reason to believe that it will carry over to performance modelling. The human language faculty is an evolutiol, try compromise between the requirements that language be easy to learn, easy to produce, and easy to comprehend. Because of this. our cognitive mechanisms for comprehension may exhibit acceptable but not optimal efficiency, and we would therefore expect a successful PMP to operate with psychologically appropriate inefficiencies.
Thus. for performance modelling, the question can be answered only by finding eases where the various hypotheses make crucially distinct predictions concerning human capabilities, errors, or profiles of cognitive load. and then testing these predictions in a careful series of psycholinguisttc experiments. It is often debated, usually by non-linguists, whether the recta-linguistic intuitions that form the empirical foundation for much of current linguistic theory are reliable indicators of the naUve speaker's underlying competence. When it comes to questions about internal processing as opposed to structural relations, the psychological literature has demonstrated many times that intuitions are deserving of even much less trust. Thus, though we may have strong beliefs to the effect that parsing and interpretation are psychologically inseparable, our theoretical commitments should rather be based on a solid experimental footing. At this point in time. the experimental evidence is mixed: semantic and syntactic processes are interleaved on-line in many situations, but there is also evidence that these processes have a separate, relatively non-interacting run-time coup.
However, no matter how the question of. dynamic fusion is ultimately resolved, it should bc clear t, ha[ dynamic interleaving or parallelism carries no implicauon of" static homogeneity. A system whose run-rune behavior has no distinguishable components may neverthelc~ have a totally dccompo~d static description. Given this possibilty, and given me evident scientific advantages that a dccornposed static spccifgation aflords. I have adopted in my own rescareh on these matters the strong working hypothesis that a statically deeomposahle sys~n co~ be constructed to provide the necessary efficiencics for practical purposes and ycL perhaps with minor modirr.ations and l'twther ~ipulations. Still supp(~n signilicant explanauons of. p~ycholingmstic phenomena.
In short, I maintain the position that the "true" comprehension system will also meet our pre-theorctic notions of. scientific elegance and "beauty'. This hypothesis, that truth and beauty are highly correlated in this domain, is perhaps implausible, but it presents a challenge for theory and implementation that has held my interest and fascination for many years.
The Linguistic Perspective.
While k is certainly Irue that our tools (computers and formal grammars) have shoged our views of" what human languages and human language preceding may be like, it seems a little bit strange to think that our views have been warped by those tools. Warping suggcsts, that there is rome other, more accurate view that we would have comc m either without mathematical or computational tools or with a set of formal tools with a substantially different character. There is no way in principle to exclude such a possibility, but it could hc tatar we have the tools wc have because they harmonize with the capabilities of the human mind for scientific understanding. That is. athough substantially different tools might be better suited to the phenomena under investigation, the results cleaved with [hose tools might not be humanly appreciable. "]'he views that have emerged from using our present tools might be far off the mark, but they might be the only views [hat we are c~hle OC Perhaps a more interesting statement can be made if the question is interpreted as posing a conflict between the views that we as computational linguists have come to. guided by our present practical and formal understanding of what constitutes a reasonable computation, and the views that [henretical linguisXs, philosophers, and others similarly unconstrained by concrete computation, might hold. Historically. computational Brammm~ have represented a mixture of intuitions about the significant gntctural generalizations of language and intuitions about what can be p~ efT~:ientiy, given a pani-'ular implementation that the grammar writer had in the back of his or her mind. This is certainly [rue of my own work on some of the catty ATN grammars. Along with many others, I felt an often unconscious pressure to move forward along • given computational path as long as possible before throwing my gramnmtical fate to the purser's general nondeterntioLs~ c~oice mechanisms, even though [his usually meant that feaster contents had to be manipulated in linguistically unjustified ways. For example, the standard ATN account of" passive sentcnces used register operations to •void backtracking that would re.analyze the NP that was initially parsed as an active subject. However. in so doing, the grammar confused the notions of surfare and deep suh)eets, and lost the ability to express gcnendizations concerning, for examplc, passive tag questions.
In hindsighL I con~der that my early views were "warped" by both the ATN formalism, with its powerful register operations, and my understanding of the particular top-down, le•right underlying pa~ing algorithm. As [ developed the more sophisticated model of parsing embodied in my General Syntactic Processor, l realized that [here was a systematic, non-fpamrr~*_~*~J way at" holding on to funcXionally mis-assigned constituent structures. Freed from worrying about exponential constituent su'ucture nondetermism, it became possible to restrict and simplify [he ATN's register oparaUons and, ultimately, to give them a non-proceduraL algebraic interpretation. The result is a new grammatical formalism, Lexical-Functiona] Grammar CKaplan & Bresnan, in press), a forrnalisan that admits a wider class of eff¢ient computational implementations than the ATN formalism just becat~ she grammar itself" makes fewer computational commi~nen~ Moreover, it is a 104 formalism that provides for the natural statement of" many language particular and universal gencralizations, h also seems to bc a formalism d'mt fatal/tales cooperaoon between linguists and computational linguists, despite the.~" diffcnng theoretical and me[hodologeaI bmses.
Just as we have been warped by our computational mechanisms, linguists have been warped by their formal tools, particularly the r~ansformational formalism.
The convergence represented by LexicalFunctional Grammar is heartening in that it suggests that imperfect tools and understanding can and will evolve into better tools and deeper insights.
3. The Interactions.
As indicated •hove, I think computational grammars have been influenced by the algorithms that we expect to appb them with. While difficult w weed out, that influence is not a thcoretica] or practical oeces~ty. By reducing and eliminaong the computational commitments of Our grammaocal forn~ism, as we have done with Lexical-Functional Grammar, it is possible to devise a variety or different parsing schemes. By comparing and coou'asUng their behavior with different grammars and sentences, we can begin to develop a deeper understanding of [he way compulationa] resources depend on properties of grammars, smngs, and algorithms. This unders~nding is essenUal both to practic~ implementations and also to psycholinguistic modelling. Furthermore, if a formalism allows grammars to be written as an abstract characterization of string--structure correspondences, the Jp~nunm" should be indifferent as to recognition or generation. We should be •hie to implement fcasible generators as well as parsers, and again, shed light on the interdependencies of grammars and grammaucal prrx:cssmg,
. Lc( me conclude with a few comments about the psychol,ogeaI validity or grammars and parsing algorithms. To the extent that a grammar cor~j.ly models a native speaker's lingtusuc compelcnce, or, less tend~Uously, the set of meta-linguistic judgments he is able to make. then ti'mt srammar has a certain psyehok~gical "validity'. h becomes much more interepang, however, if" it can •l~.J be cmpeddcd in a psychologeally accurate motel of speaking and comprehending, h.~ all cumpct¢,nce grammars will mcc~ [his additional requL,~ment, but I have the optLmis~c belief that such a grammar will ~y be found.
It is also possible to find psychological validation for a parsing algorithm in the •bsence of a particular Ipmnn~. One could in principle adduce evidence to [he effect that [he architecture of [he parser, the structuring of its memory and operations, corresponds point by point to well-e,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,~mhl~hed cognitive mectmnisms. As • research strategy for •fraying at a psychologically valid model of comprehension, it is much more reasonable to develop linguisr.ically justified 8rammars and computationaUy motivated pmT, ing algorithms in a collaborative effort. A model with such independently motivated yet mutually compatible knowledBe and process components is much more likely to resuh in an explanatory account of [he mechanisms underlying human linguisl~ abilil~=.
